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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(a). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Republic's Deck Hockey application was properly denied by UDOT's 
hearing officer and properly upheld by the trial court because of the 
simple undisputed fact that another outdoor advertising sign physically 
existed within 500 feet of Republic's proposed location. 
This is a legal issue requiring application of the controlling statute, Utah Code 
Annotated § 72-7-505(3 )(a), to undisputed facts. This Court "afford[s] no deference to 
the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness." Schaerrer v. 
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922. The issue was preserved in 
the district court's November 24, 2008 Final Order and Judgment (R.3493-97). 
2. The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning Reagan's Lindal 
Permit. 
The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 
70, ^[8-10, 180P.3d778. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v. 
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's 
October 1, 2008 Order and Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically ^ 3.01 to 3.05). 
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3. The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning the SSL 
Wilderness Permit. 
The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, supra. Ques-
tions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 
supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's October 1, 2008 Order and 
Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically fflf 5.01 to 5.09). 
4. The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider Republic's claims concerning the UDOT 
Wilderness Permit. 
The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies is a question of law. Decker v. Rolfe, supra. Ques-
tions of law are reviewed for correctness. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 
supra. This issue was preserved in the district court's October 1, 2008 Order and 
Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically fflf 4.01 to 4.10). 
5. The district court correctly determined that Republic failed to present 
sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of material fact that 
would demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of 
remedies requirements apply. 
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the facts and 
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sur. Underwriters 
v. E&FC Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, 10 P.3d 338. This issue was preserved in the district 
court's October 1, 2008 Order and Judgment (R.3476-88, specifically ffif 3.04, 4.09, 5.04.). 
Page 2 of 48 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set forth in 
Subsection 72-7-504(1) or in H-1 zones may not be closer than 500 feet 
to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway or 
limited access primary highway, except that signs may be erected closer 
than 500 feet if the signs on the same side of the interstate highway or 
limited access primary highway are not simultaneously visible. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Republic's "Nature of the Case" section of its brief can be ignored. See Republic's 
Brief, pp. 5-8. It consists mostly of a vitriolic diatribe, lacks any record citations, and 
provides little assistance with this Court's review of the relevant issues. 
This appeal is about (1) whether the district court correctly upheld the decision of a 
UDOT administrative hearing officer to deny Republic's request to build an outdoor 
advertising sign, see November 20, 2008 Final Order and Judgment, R.3493-98, and (2) 
whether the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in 
this administrative appeal to consider other claims raised by Republic, see Sept. 30, 2008 
Order and Judgment R.3476-88). 
The necessary procedural background is not complex. Republic filed an applica-
tion with UDOT for an outdoor advertising sign, referred to herein as the "Deck Hockey" 
sign. See Compl., pp. 1-6 (R.l-6); First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl, pp. 1-5 (R.689-
93). A UDOT permit officer denied this application because the proposed Deck Hockey 
sign was too close in proximity to a Reagan sign, referred to herein as the "Lindal sign." 
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See Compl., ^ 10 (R.2). A UDOT administrative hearing officer upheld the permits 
officer's denial of Republic's application for the Deck Hockey sign. Republic then 
appealed to the district court. See id., ^ 12 (R.3). 
However, pursuant to its First Amended Complaint and Supplemental Complaint, 
id, Republic did not simply seek re-examination of the discrete question of whether the 
Deck Hockey application had been properly denied; it sought new and additional relief 
against parties that had not been a part of the UDOT administrative proceedings on 
appeal. In its amended pleadings, Republic named not only UDOT, but South Salt Lake 
City ("SSL") and Reagan. See First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl (R.689-93). In 
addition to asserting that UDOT had improperly denied its own permit application, 
Republic sought a determination from the district court that Reagan's Lindal Permit, 
along with Reagan's permits for two other signs, were void. See id. One of these signs is 
referred to as the "Wilderness" sign (the district court referred to it as the "WLH" sign). 
This sign involved permits both from SSL (hereafter the "SSL Wilderness Permit") and 
from UDOT (the "UDOT Wilderness Permit"). See idl 
Reagan and the other defendants/appellees each moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's 
claims concerning Reagan's permits. See, e.g., Reagan's First and Second Motions for 
1
 The district court dismissed Republic's claims concerning the "Russell sign" for 
lack of standing. See, Sept. Order, R.3487. This dismissal is not on appeal. 
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Summary Judgment (R. 1207-09, 1328-29). The district court agreed with the defendants/ 
appellees and determined that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 
in relation to its objections to the Lindal Permit, the SSL Wilderness Permit and the 
UDOT Wilderness Permit issued to Reagan. See September 30, 2008 Order and 
Judgment (R.3476-88) ("Sept. Order"). Based on this determination, it granted the 
defendants '/appellees' motions for summary judgment relating to each of these permits. 
See, id. UDOT then moved for summary judgment that the administrative hearing officer 
had properly denied Republic's Deck Hockey application. Based on the undisputed exist-
ence of the Lindal sign within 500 feet of the proposed Deck Hockey location, the district 
court granted UDOT's motion. See, Final Order and Judgment, R.3494-97 ("Nov. 
Judgment"). 
Accordingly, there are only two question for this Court: (1) whether the district 
court correctly upheld the administrative hearing officer's denial of Republic's Deck 
Hockey application, and (2) whether the district court correctly determined that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to make any rulings with respect to Reagan's permits (the 
Lindal Permit, the SSL Wilderness Permit and the UDOT Wilderness Permit). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Republic's "Statement of the Facts," does not set forth facts that will assist this 
Court with its review of the district court's determination. Republic does not show what 
facts were properly presented to the district court on the defendants'/appellees' respective 
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motions for summary judgment, and mostly delves into facts that have nothing to do with 
the questions on appeal. Most of the "facts" asserted by Republic describe Republic's 
perception of the validity of Reagan's various permits. See Republic's Brief, pp. 10-11, 
13-20. This has no bearing whatsoever on the questions at hand, to wit, whether Republic 
properly exhausted its administrative remedies regarding Reagan's sign permits, and 
whether the proximity of the Lindal sign to the proposed Deck Hockey location was a 
sufficient basis for the hearing officer to deny the Deck Hockey application. 
The district court made numerous factual findings in its Sept. Order (R.3476-81) 
and its Nov. Judgment (R.3493-98) that accurately describe the background necessary for 
an appellate determination. As set forth at footnote 3 below, Republic has challenged 
only one of these facts, paragraph 1.09 of the Sept. Order, but this challenge is neither 
material nor relevant. See infra, p. 17 n.3. Accordingly, Reagan sets forth the relevant 
undisputed facts verbatim (including parentheses) as determined by the district court: 
September Order 
1.01. On or about May 13, 2002, Republic applied to UDOT for an outdoor 
advertising permit in connection with a proposed billboard on property known in this 
litigation as the "Deck Hockey property." 
1.02. UDOT's permits officer denied Republic's application on July 31, 2003, on 
the basis that the proposed location was within 500 feet of a sign location that several 
months earlier had been permitted to Reagan (the "Lindal" permit or the "Lindal" sign), 
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and that the Deck Hockey Permit would not be allowed under the spacing requirements of 
Utah law governing outdoor advertising. 
1.03. After an informal hearing on Republic's appeal of that denial, UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer upheld the permits officer's denial of Republic's 
application for the Deck Hockey permit. Republic appealed to this Court. 
1.04. Republic asserts, inter alia, that UDOT improperly issued the Permit to 
Reagan. 
1.05. In February 1998, Reagan submitted applications to move three billboards 
in the vicinity north of the Deck Hockey property. One of those applications concerned 
the Permit. UDOT's permits officer had denied those applications and Reagan invoked 
UDOT's appellate procedures to challenge that denial. 
1.06. On September 22, 1998, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an 
order stating that further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal "shall be conducted 
formally according to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-l 1." That order was 
never revoked. 
1.07. On February 1, 1999, UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an 
order upholding the permits officer's denial of Reagan's applications. Reagan appealed 
that decision to the Third District Court. 
1.08. On March 8, 2000, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, the 
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district court vacated the February 1, 1999 UDOT order and remanded the case to 
facilitate settlement negotiations between UDOT and Reagan. 
1.09. As of May 2002, Republic knew that UDOT was considering issuing the 
Permit to Reagan, but had not yet done so. 
1.10. Republic also knew in May 2002 that UDOT had taken the position that it 
would consider Reagan's application for the Permit before it would consider an 
application from Republic within 500 feet. 
1.11. In May 2002, Republic believed that the original building permit Reagan 
had received from SSL for the Lindal sign had expired, and that another SSL building 
permit that Republic held in the area would preclude UDOT from issuing the Permit. 
1.12. Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision to grant 
Reagan's Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny Republic's Deck 
Hockey application. 
1.13. Republic did not undertake any action to formally request to intervene in 
UDOT's proceedings concerning Reagan's application for the Permit ("Lindal 
proceedings"). 
1.14. On January 23, 2003, pursuant to stipulation between UDOT and Reagan, 
UDOT's administrative hearing officer issued an "Order on Partial Settlement," finding 
that Reagan's application for the Permit was not precluded by law, and ordering UDOT to 
immediately issue a permit to Reagan. 
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1.15. UDOT issued the Permit, and then denied Republic's application for the 
Deck Hockey permit on July 31, 2003. 
1.16. On September 21, 2005, Reagan applied for and received from SSL a 
permit to erect a billboard on property known as Wilderness Log Homes (the "Wilderness 
Property"), which is approximately 500 feet to the South of the Lindal billboard. 
1.17. On October 24, 2006, Reagan applied for and received a permit from 
UDOT to erect the billboard on the Wilderness Property. 
1.18. Reagan built the Wilderness billboard in January 2006, and removed the 
Lindal billboard. 
1.19. The Wilderness sign was within 500 feet of the location where Republic 
proposed to build the Deck Hockey sign. 
***** [district court deleted proposed finding]. 
1.21 On February 28, 2006 Republic, submitted a GRAMA request to SSL, 
asking for copies of Reagan's permit application for the Wilderness billboard. 
1.22. Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decision to issue the Wilderness 
permit at any time within the next 10 days. 
1.23. Republic did not file an appeal of UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness 
Permit at any time within the next 30 days. 
1.24. In a hearing on October 3, 2006 regarding a Motion to Dismiss brought by 
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UDOT and a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Republic, this Court (Judge 
Hilder) ordered Republic to amend its complaint within ten days to join Reagan. The 
order on that hearing was signed and entered on October 24, 2006. 
1.25. On October 10, 2006, Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding that UDOT 
revoke Reagan's Wilderness Permit and the permit for another Reagan sign that is across 
the freeway (the "Russell sign" or the "Russell permit"). The letter also demanded that 
UDOT make certain declarations regarding the Russell sign, and also that UDOT declare 
that the Deck Hockey application preceded the Wilderness application and that the 
Wilderness Permit was void on the basis of various allegations. 
1.26. During briefing and oral argument on the current motions. Republic 
conceded that it had no standing to make any challenge to the Russell sign or permit. 
1.27. On October 26, 2006, Republic amended its Complaint and filed its 
Supplemental Complaint in this litigation, bringing both Reagan and SSL in as 
defendants. 
1.28. On October 31, 2006, UDOT responded to Republic's October 10th demand, 
stating that "the statute prohibits us from initiating declaratory proceedings.. . . Although 
prohibited from investigating your claims by a declaratory action, I will direct the 
Department's staff to look into your allegations and take whatever administrative action 
they may find necessary. I have asked them to complete their investigation within 30 
days and report back to me with their findings." 
Page 10 of 48 
1.29. On December 14, 2006, Republic filed with this Court a pleading entitled 
"Notice of Filing of Documents re: Exhaustion of Remedies on Wilderness Log Homes 
Sign and Supplemental Documents Concerning Lindal Cedar Homes Sign" (hereafter 
"Notice re: Exhaustion of Remedies"). In that document, Republic stated, "More than 30 
days have elapsed since the receipt of the October 31st letter and . . . no action has been 
taken to either correct or revoke the Reagan permits." 
1.30. Republic did not file or ask leave to file any new complaint until March 5, 
2007. 
November Judgment 
D. The existing sign at the time of the denial of Republic's application was 
owned by Reagan and was located at the north end of real property referred to in this 
litigation as the "Lindal property." 
E. The distance between the proposed Deck Hockey sign location and the 
Lindal sign location was closer than 500 feet. 
F. The Lindal sign was built in its permitted location. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly upheld the UDOT hearing officer's denial of Republic's 
Deck Hockey application, regardless of Republic's arguments concerning the validity or 
invalidity of any of Reagan's permits, as the proposed Deck Hockey location was within 
500 feet of an existing sign. 
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For numerous reasons, the district court correctly determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review Republic's arguments regarding the Lindal Permit. The district 
court correctly ruled that the Lindal Proceedings were formal, that Republic had a right to 
but did not intervene in those proceedings, and that Republic had, as a consequence, 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Republic fails to show any error in 
connection with any of these determinations. To the contrary, there is no dispute that 
Republic failed to intervene in the Lindal Proceedings and that its failure prevents it from 
making a collateral challenge to the outcome of those proceedings. In addition, Republic 
has failed to set forth any facts that could show the district court erred when it determined 
that no exception to the exhaustion doctrine applied in this case 
Republic's third, fourth and ninth arguments on appeal each discuss the merits of 
Republic's arguments relating to the validity of Reagan's permits. These arguments were 
not ruled on by the district court, as they were rendered moot by the district court's 
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
Republic fails to show that the district court erred when it determined that it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Republic's arguments relating to both the 
SSL and the UDOT Wilderness Permits. Once again, these determinations rested on the 
fact that Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Republic is unable to 
show any error on the part of the district court and is unable to point to any facts of record 
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that could show that the district court should have excused Republic from the exhaustion 
requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE DENIAL OF 
REPUBLIC'S DECK HOCKEY APPLICATION. 
Utah law prohibits UDOT from issuing outdoor advertising permits if the result 
would have two outdoor advertising signs physically located closer than 500 feet from 
each other. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(a) (a sign "may not be closer than 500 
feet to an existing off-premise sign").2 The district court referenced this controlling 
statute in its final conclusions of law in this case. See, Nov. Judgment, par. 3. (R.3495). 
The district court found that at the time the permit officer denied Republic's Deck 
Hockey application, Reagan's Lindal sign physically existed within 500 feet of 
Republic's proposed location. Id., pars. C, D, E, and 4 (R.3495). Based on these 
undisputed findings and the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3 )(a), the district 
found that UDOT's hearing officer had properly denied Republic's application for a 
permit. Id. 
Republic has not challenged these factual findings. Republic has not even 
mentioned in its Brief how the controlling statute and the physical proximity of the Lindal 
2
 An "off-premise sign" is "an outdoor advertising sign that advertises an activity, 
service, or product and that is located on premises other than the premises at which 
activity or service occurs or product is sold or manufactured." Utah Admin. Code R933-
2-3(16). 
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sign affected its Deck Hockey application. Instead, Republic has attacked the validity of 
the UDOT permit that Reagan had for the Lindal sign. This is apparently because in 
addition to upholding the hearing officer on the basis of the physical proximity of the 
Lindal sign, the district court also noted that Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-507(6) would 
prohibit UDOT from issuing an outdoor advertising permit "within 500 feet of a 
permitted sign location except to the permit holder...." (R.3495). This would provide an 
alternate ground on which to uphold the administrative hearing officer's denial of the 
Deck Hockey application. Republic hopes to convince this Court that if the Lindal Permit 
was void, then the Lindal sign was not in a permitted location and the hearing officer 
should have granted Republic's Deck Hockey application. But nothing Republic can say 
about the validity or invalidity of Reagan's permits helps it on this appeal. The 
undisputed physical proximity of the existing sign and the proposed sign is sufficient 
alone to affirm the district court's ruling. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT DID NOT 
HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW REPUBLIC'S ARGUMENTS 
CONCERNING THE LINDAL PERMIT. 
To assess the claims asserted by Republic in the first issue that it states on appeal, 
it is important to understand the context in which they are presented. Republic's district 
court action is an appeal of an administrative proceeding concerning Republic's 
application to UDOT for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising on Deck Hockey. See, 
CompL, f6 (R.l-6). UDOT's permits officer had denied Republic's application because 
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the proposed sign was too close in proximity to Reagan's sign on the Lindal property. 
See id, f 10 (R.2). Republic then appealed the denial of its own application to UDOT's 
administrative hearing officer, (see, id. at <f 11). In a proceeding in which Reagan was not 
a party, Republic purported to challenge the validity of UDOT's actions in granting 
Reagan's permit. Id. at ^ 14-17. The administrative hearing officer upheld the permit 
officer's denial of Republic's application for the Deck Hockey sign. See id. Republic 
then appealed to the district court. At the district court, Republic again did not simply 
seek re-examination of the question of whether its own Deck Hockey application had 
been properly denied. Instead, it continued its quest, in the absence of Reagan, for a 
determination that the permit was invalid. See First Am. Compl. and Supp. Compl. 
(R.689-701). 
Republic spends much of its brief explaining the proceedings whereby Reagan 
received the Lindal Permit. In short, Reagan filed its application for the Lindal Permit in 
1998, the application was denied, Reagan appealed to a UDOT administrative hearing 
officer who also denied the request, Reagan appealed to the district court, UDOT and 
Reagan subsequently stipulated and the district court ordered that the hearing officer's 
order be vacated so that the parties could pursue settlement, UDOT and Reagan 
ultimately settled and the Lindal Permit was issued. (R.3477-79). In the interim, after the 
remand from the district court and before the Lindal Permit was issued, Republic 
submitted its application to build a sign on the nearby Deck Hockey property. Id. 
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Republic had knowledge that the Lindal proceedings were under way. It had a 
right to intervene in them, but did not do so. Thus, Republic's attack on the Lindal Permit 
amounts to a collateral attack on a prior determination in a proceeding in which Republic 
had the opportunity to, but did not, participate. Republic did not attempt to avail itself of, 
let alone exhaust, its administrative remedies, and therefore could not assert its arguments 
concerning the Lindal Permit for the first time to the district court. Accordingly, the 
district court properly determined that it had no subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed 
the action. 
Republic asserts that the district court erred when it ruled that: (1) the Lindal 
proceedings were formal proceedings; (2) to which intervention was permitted; and (3) 
that Republic had "somehow failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not intervening 
therein.'5 Republic's Brief, p. 27. Republic's argument ignores the undisputed facts as 
determined by the district court, as well as applicable statutes, regulations and cases. The 
legal conclusions entered by the district court are as follows: 
3.01. The Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all 
times after UDOT's administrative hearing officer entered his 
September 22, 1998 order. 
3.02. Republic had a right to intervene in the Lindal 
proceedings, but could do so only by filing a signed written 
petition with UDOT before UDOT's administrative hearing 
officer issued his order requiring UDOT to issue the Permit to 
[Reagan]. 
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3.03. Since Republic did not intervene in the Lindal 
proceedings, Republic did not exhaust its available 
administrative remedies. 
3.04. Republic has failed to present sufficient 
evidence to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would 
demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of 
remedies requirements applies. 
3.05. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Republic's claims concerning the Permit. 
Order & Judgment, ffif 3.01-3.05. 
These conclusions were based on the district court's undisputed factual findings 
that UDOT issued an order stating that "further proceedings regarding Reagan's appeal 
'shall be conducted formally according to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-
11,'" id., \ 1.06, that Republic was aware of the existence of those proceedings and the 
effect a determination therein would have on its own permit, id., f^l[ 1.09-1.12, and that 
Republic did not seek to intervene in those proceedings, id., ^ 1.13. 
1. The District Court Correctly Found that the Lindal Proceedings were 
Formal. 
Republic does not specifically challenge the undisputed factual findings made by 
the district court that support this determination.3 In any event, there is no question that 
3
 The only attempt to contest any of the facts the district court found undisputed is 
found in a footnote at page 55 of Republic's Brief. However, close inspection reveals 
that Republic mostly challenges the district court's conclusions, rather than its factual 
findings. Republic "disputes" paragraphs 3.01, 4.02, 5.03, and 5.06. See id. Each of 
these were conclusions of law. (R.3482, 3484-86.) The only fact disputed by Republic is 
that it knew as of May 2002 that UDOT was considering the permit. Republic's Brief, p. 
(continued...) 
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the Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings. The September 22, 1998 UDOT Order 
unequivocally declared that, due to Reagan's request for hearing, further proceedings 
would be conducted formally. See September 22, 1998 UDOT Order. (R.2662-2710, Ex. 
C to Affidavit of Daniel A. Reagan). This determination is consistent with the applicable 
provision of the Utah Administrative Code, which in 1997 provided that "[a]ny written 
request for hearing shall be treated as converting the process from an informal process to 
a formal process." Utah Admin. Code R907-1-5(K) (1997). Subsequently, the February 
1, 1999 UDOT Order reiterated that "[t]he above matter came on for a formal 
3(...continued) 
55 n. 38. This fact was based on a statement made by Republic representatives in May 
2002 to UDOT, including, inter alia, "if UDOT is going to take a position denying one of 
two competitors a permit under 'preemption' it must do so by denying the [Lindal] 
application and not the Republic application." See, generally, record citations in 
Reagan's Reply Memorandum in Support of its First Dispositive Motion, pp. 3-4 
(R.2752-53). Regardless, Republic admits that it had such knowledge as of Fall 2002. Id, 
The district court found that "Republic knew no later than November 2002 that a decision 
to grant Reagan's Lindal application would automatically be a decision to deny 
Republic's Deck Hockey application," (R.3479, par. 1.12). This was at least two months 
before the hearing officer issued its January 2003 order requiring UDOT to issue the 
Lindal Permit. (R.3479, % 1.14.) Thus, this dispute is not a material one that makes any 
difference to the outcome of this case. Aside from this immaterial fact, Republic has 
failed to specify any particular fact at issue, let alone explain why that fact was incorrectly 
determined to be undisputed by the district court, and thus has failed to meet its burden on 
appeal. See Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ^ 53, 201 P.3d 966 ("When, 
as here, the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the 
basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving 
party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." 
(quotations and citation omitted.); see also Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Biding Club, Inc., 
2009 UT App 119, \ 26, 208 P.3d 1077 ("A district court is not obliged to comb the 
record to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists to prevent 
summary judgment. Rather, it is the nonmoving party's burden to demonstrate that such a 
conflict exists."). 
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administrative hearing...." February 1, 1999 UDOT Order, p. 1, attached as Exhibit C-2 
to Reagan's memorandum in support of its first summary judgment motion (R.1210-
1327). Thus, the district court correctly determined that the Lindal proceedings were 
formal. 
Republic admits that the Lindal proceedings were formal in 1998, but suggests that 
they somehow lost their formal character by 2002. (Republic's Brief, pp. 27-29). 
Republic cites no legal authority for this assertion. Rather than address the governing 
rules applied by the district court, Republic cites R-901-1-1, Utah Administrative Code, 
"effective 2/02/2002," for the proposition that there is a presumption that administrative 
appeals are "informal in nature." Republic's Brief, p. 28. Republic fails to explain how 
or why this rule would or should be retroactively applied to alter the nature of 
proceedings that became formal in 1998. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part of these 
revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"). The district court's legal 
conclusion that "[t]he Lindal proceedings were formal proceedings at all times after 
UDOT's administrative hearing officer entered his September 22, 1998 order" should not 
be disturbed. 
2. The District Court Correctly Found that Republic had a Right to 
Intervene in the Lindal Proceedings. 
Under Utah Code section 63-46b-95 "any person not a party may file a signed 
written petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(l) (2001). Republic's ability to intervene in the Lindal 
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proceedings under this statute was not merely permissive, but one of right. See id; see 
also Millard Co. v. Utah State Tax Com % 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991). Had Republic 
intervened, it could then have appealed any order issued therein to the district court. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (2001). It is undisputed that Republic did not take 
advantage of this administrative remedy. Thus, Republic failed to present its position, 
and UDOT's hearing officer granted the permit without Republic's input. 
The "requirement of participation at agency level 'ensures that those who have an 
interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts and considerations at the 
time the agency makes its decision.'" S&G v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) 
(citation omitted). Without Republic there to make its own arguments, the hearing officer 
presiding in the Lindal proceedings had no reason or opportunity to even consider them. 
3. Whether a Party Has Exhausted its Administrative Remedies Is a 
Legal, Not a Factual Determination. 
Republic does not address, let alone distinguish, these governing statutes or 
regulations, and makes no argument as to how the district court misapplied them. 
Republic instead argues that the district court erred because it did not construe facts in a 
light most favorable to Republic when it determined whether the Lindal proceedings were 
formal or informal. See Republic's Brief, p. 29. This argument is without merit. The 
underlying facts regarding the proceedings themselves were undisputed. The district 
court simply needed to determine whether, under those facts, Republic failed as a matter 
of law to exhaust its administrative remedies. Whether a party is required to exhaust 
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administrative remedies is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. See Mack v. Utah State 
Dept of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ^ 22, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79; see also Decker v. Rolfe, 
2008 UT App 70, ffi[ 8-10, 180 P.3d 778 (holding that the determination of whether a 
court has subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a 
question of law). Thus, the court's determination was a legal one; it was not a 
determination that was to be construed in a light most favorable to Republic. 
4. Republic Had an Obligation to Protect its Own Rights, Not Rely on 
UDOT to Tell it How to Proceed. 
Republic then complains that it is being held to an "omniscient standard," that it 
had no way of knowing that the Lindal proceedings were formal. Republic's Brief, pp. 
27-28. Republic could have asked; there is no evidence that it ever did. Nor is there any 
evidence that Republic would have been prevented from presenting a GRAMA request to 
UDOT to determine the nature of the proceedings. Alternatively, if Republic did not 
know if the proceedings were informal or formal, Republic could have petitioned UDOT 
to convert the Lindal proceedings to formal proceedings so that it could intervene to 
present its position. Utah Admin. Rule R907-1-1 (2002). It would have learned through 
that process that the proceedings were already formal. Republic could even have asked 
the hearing officer to combine the Deck Hockey and Lindal proceedings into a single one 
to determine who should be awarded a permit in the area. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(7). 
Republic did none of those things. 
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Republic attempts to excuse this failure by proposing that UDOT should have told 
it that it had these alternate rights. Republic even complains that UDOT's counsel and 
Reagan's counsel actually deliberately misled Republic. Even if that were true, neither of 
those individuals had control over Republic's rights - the applicable statutes and rules 
were determinative of those rights, and the ultimate decision-maker was the 
administrative hearing officer, not counsel for Reagan or UDOT. Republic cannot assert 
that it was entitled to rely on any counsel but its own to advise it of its rights. 
Contrary to its assertion, Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, 180 P.3d 778, does not 
support Republic's unique proposition that UDOT was obligated to relieve Republic of its 
responsibility to consult the law to determine its own rights. That case is limited to its 
facts, the statute at issue there, and prior appellate precedents interpreting that statute. 
The language of the applicable statute provided that "'[a] person . . . whose [driver's] 
license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the [Utah Driver License Djivision 
may seek judicial review of the division's order." Id. at f^ 10. Nothing in the statute 
prohibited direct judicial review after the order affecting license status, and the Court of 
Appeals noted that it had previously interpreted the statute to relieve aggrieved parties 
from the obligation to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking review. Id. 
In addition to this statutory language, the plaintiff had received conflicting notices of his 
remedies from the Division; first he was told he only had the right to appeal to the district 
court, id., at \ 5, and later he was told that he had an option to request reconsideration, but 
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also that this subsequent notice "does not replace any prior notice already in effect." Id. 
at *U 6. On the basis of the statutory language existing at the time of the relevant events 
and in light of the conflicting notices the Division had sent, the Court of Appeals 
"conclude[d] that the district court had jurisdiction to review the Division's admini-
strative action." Id. at f 11. 
No similar facts or law exist in this case. The verbal comments of UDOT's and 
Reagan's counsel were not the equivalent of the official notices that the Decker plaintiff 
had received. Nor has Republic cited to any other "notice" from UDOT that "directed 
Court appeal was the sole recourse of Republic." (Republic's Brief, p. 34). Further, the 
applicable administrative rule in 2002 specifically stated that "Persons must exhaust their 
administrative remedies in accordance with Section 63-46b-14, prior to seeking judicial 
review." R907-1-15 (2002). Decker is simply inapposite. 
Despite its protestations of helplessness, there is no basis in law or fact for 
Republic's assertion that it had the right to be rescued by UDOT. Its failure to determine 
the appropriate administrative remedies does not excuse Republic's failure to pursue 
those available avenues of relief. 
5. The Deck Hockey Proceeding Was an Improper Venue to Challenge 
the Lindal Permit. 
Republic then asserts that pursuing its complaints regarding the Lindal Permit 
within the confines of its own Deck Hockey proceedings was a sufficient pursuit of 
administrative remedies. This is incorrect. Utah law is well-settled that objections to the 
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proceedings of an administrative agency must be made while it has an opportunity to 
correct them. Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Paul v. City of Manhattan, 511 P.2d 244, 249 (Kan. 1973)). Had Republic 
participated in the Lindal proceedings before the permit was granted, it might have 
convinced the hearing office of the efficacy of its arguments, and the Liadal Permit might 
not have been issued. Republic scoffs, and claims this avenue would have been futile, 
pointing to the fact that the hearing officer announced in the Deck Hockey proceedings 
how he would have ruled on Republic's arguments. (Republic's Brief, pp. 30-31). 
Notably, the hearing officer had not made that announcement before the Lindal 
proceedings concluded. There is no evidence except Republic's speculation that the 
hearing officer might not have made a different ruling had the permit not already been 
issued. Moreover, Republic's speculation as to what the hearing officer would have ruled 
in the Lindal proceedings is irrelevant to the fact that Republic raised the argument in the 
incorrect forum. If Republic had raised and lost the argument in the Lindal proceedings, 
it would have had the right to appeal to the district court. Cf Holladay Towne Center, 
LLC v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, t 8, 192 P.3d 302 (holding that "'[t]he omission 
of an imposed duty designed to advise an administrative body of [an error that could be 
corrected]'" was mandatory, and that to hold otherwise "[would] accrue to the advantage 
of the one who failed in the duty. This turns a delict into a triumph.'") (citations omitted). 
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Republic failed to participate in the Lindal proceedings, and thus failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies concerning the issuance of the Lindal Permit. 
The fundamental difference between raising its arguments concerning the Lindal 
Permit in the Lindal proceedings vs. the Deck Hockey proceedings is Reagan's right to 
participate and defend its rights. If Republic had won its arguments concerning the 
validity of the Lindal Permit based on pre-issuance events, then Reagan would have had 
the right to appeal to protect its interests. Post-issuance, what Republic effectively sought 
to accomplish by challenging the (already-issued) Lindal Permit in the Deck Hockey 
proceedings was to have UDOT revoke it. In other words, Republic wanted UDOT to 
strip Reagan of its vested right to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on the Lindal 
property. But after the Lindal Permit was issued, UDOT could revoke the permit only for 
certain specified reasons, and then only in compliance with the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA")- See Utah Code. Ann. § 72-7-508(1) and (3). To protect 
Reagan's due process rights, an adjudicative proceeding in which Reagan had a right to 
participate and defend itself would have to be commenced. See, e.g., Brinton v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998) (any notion of fundamental fairness in 
administrative proceedings includes the principle of the opportunity to rebut and defend 
allegations of wrong-doing). 
If Republic believed that Reagan had engaged in activities after the Lindal Permit 
was issued that would be sufficient cause for revocation, then it could have filed a 
Page 25 of 48 
Request for Agency Action with UDOT, thereby commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) (1991).4 See also Utah Admin. Code R.907-
1. Republic asserts that its request for rehearing of the initial denial issued by the Deck 
Hockey hearing officer was such a Request for Agency Action. (Republic's Brief, pp. 
34-36). Notably, Republic did not ask in that petition for UDOT to revoke Reagan's 
permit; it only asserted that UDOT "was not at liberty to grant Reagan's application" over 
Republic's. Id. at 35. At that point, the Lindal Permit had already been issued and the 
sign erected. More fundamentally, however, Republic did not comply with Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(b), which requires that a person other than the agency who initiates 
adjudicative proceedings "shall mail a copy to each person known to have a direct interest 
in the requested agency action." Obviously Reagan would have had a direct interest in 
any demand by Republic that UDOT revoke the Lindal Permit. Further, Reagan would 
have been a party to any UDOT revocation proceeding, with full rights to participate to 
protect its vested rights. There is no evidence that Republic ever even notified Reagan 
that it was challenging the Lindal Permit. Indeed, it was not until long after the 
administrative proceedings on the Deck Hockey application had concluded and Republic 
had appealed that Republic took any action to involve Reagan - and that was only after it 
"was forced to join Reagan as a party by order of the [district] court." (Republic's Brief, 
4
 The Administrative Procedures Act was recodified in 2008 at Title 63G, Chapter 
4. Because the events at issue precede that recodification, this Brief will reference the 
prior version of the Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b. 
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p. 43). Republic argues that requiring it to simultaneously pursue a second administrative 
action would have been absurd. (Republic's Brief, p. 33). Yet far from being "a 
convenient means for administrative bodies to avoid judicial scrutiny," id., the protection 
of Reagan's due process rights in an adjudicative proceeding in which it would have a 
right to participate is an issue of constitutional proportions. 
Republic was required to assert its arguments concerning the Lindal Permit sign in 
the correct forum and proceedings, to wit, an administrative forum in which Reagan 
would have been entitled to participate fully.5 If UDOT did not grant Republic's Request 
for Agency Action and revoke the Lindal Permit, then Republic could have appealed that 
determination to the district court, and Reagan would have had the right to participate in 
that appeal. Republic failed to do so. The legal effect of its failure is that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Republic's arguments. 
Republic's inaction precludes judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(2) (2001). Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that it did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction in regard to Republic's arguments concerning the Lindal 
Permit. Republic offers no reason to overturn the district court's determination in regard 
to Republic's untimely and improper attack of the Lindal Permits. 
5
 Contrary to Republic's protestations that it would have had no discovery rights at 
the administrative level, the administrative rules applicable to UDOT allow for summons 
to be issued (Utah Admin. Code R-907-l-10(14)(a) (2003) and for discovery "as may be 
prescribed by and in the manner provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 
subparagraph (b). 
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C REPUBLIC'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING REAGAN'S R-407 APPLICA-
TION ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AS THE DISTRICT 
COURT NEVER MADE A RULING ON THE ISSUES RAISED. 
Republic's third and fourth issues on appeal relate to its substantive arguments as 
to how post-issuance events concerning Reagan's R-407 application affected the validity 
of the Lindal Permit. See Republic's Brief, p. 2 ("Did the trial Court err in not finding 
Reagan's altered R-407 [application for the Permit] to be a forged document?"), and p. 3 
("Did the Court err in failing to recognize that Reagan's alteration of the R-407 form 
constituted a new application without any retroactive effect?"). These issues were not 
considered by the district court, as the court determined it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction in regard to Republic's claims relating to the Lindal Permit. See Sept. Order, 
K 3.05 (R.3483), f^ 4.10 (R.3485). "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eirnac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Once the district court determined that it had no 
subject matter jurisdiction, that was the end of its inquiry. Accordingly, these issues are 
not properly before this Court.6 
6
 Even if this Court found that the district court erred in some fashion by failing to 
review these arguments, remand would make no difference in the outcome of this case. 
As Reagan explained to the district court, should Republic prevail on these arguments, its 
own permit application would also have to be rejected, because absent alterations to the 
application, the billboard for which Republic applied was, without dispute, too large and 
violated existing ordinances. (R. 1223-25.) 
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D. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED IT LACKED 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER REPUBLIC'S 
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO THE WILDERNESS PERMITS RAISED 
IN THE "SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT", 
Republic's fifth, seventh and eighth stated issues on appeal relate to the district 
court's determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Repub-
lic's arguments relating to the Wilderness Permits from UDOT and SSL. Once again, 
some background information is helpful in order to understand the context in which 
Republic asserts such arguments. 
In 2004, Republic initiated its request for district court review of UDOT's denial 
of Republic's Deck Hockey application. Republic subsequently filed an Amended Com-
plaint, naming SSL and Reagan as defendants, and attempting to collaterally attack 
Reagan's Lindal Permit. This is the subject of Republic's first, third, and fourth issues on 
appeal, addressed supra. 
Within this same action, Republic also filed a "Supplemental Complaint," vastly 
expanding the scope of the proceedings before the district court, and asking that court 
void UDOT and SSL permits on two other outdoor advertising signs owned by Reagan.7 
Once again, this attempt to collaterally attack Reagan's permits was properly rejected by 
the district court, again on the basis that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. Republic presents this Court with no reason to disturb the lower court's ruling. 
7
 Republic's challenge as to the second of those two signs, i.e., the Russell sign, is 
not an issue on appeal. See footnote 1, supra. 
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1. Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it Determined 
That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative Remedies in 
Relation to the SSL Wilderness Permit. 
Republic argues in its seventh issue on appeal that the district court erred when it 
held that Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in relation to the SSL 
Wilderness Permit. However, Republic does not address a single conclusion made by the 
district court in this regard, or the underlying facts that support such conclusions. By 
ignoring these determinations, Republic provides this Court with no basis to overturn 
them. Once again, Republic sets forth no facts "sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case," Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f^ 23, 
116 P.3d 323, and fails to identify any particular legal flaw in the district court's analysis, 
see Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, ^ 8, 217 P.3d 723. 
The district court's undisputed factual findings included: Reagan applied for and 
received the SSL Wilderness Permit in September 2005 (Sept. Order, % 1.16, R.3479), the 
sign was built in January 2006 (id., ^ 1.18, R.3480), Republic submitted a GRAMA 
request to SSL in February 2006 asking for information relating to this permit (id., ^ 
1.21), and Republic did not file an appeal of SSL's decision to issue this permit within the 
next ten days after it admittedly had actual notice of the permit (id., *f 1.22). Based on 
these factual findings, the district court determined that Republic was obligated to exhaust 
its administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the SSL Board of Adjustment before 
filing suit in district court to challenge the permit (R.3485-86). The district court then 
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determined that Republic's failure to pursue its administrative remedies rendered the 
district court without jurisdiction to consider the claims (id.), and that Republic's attempt 
to circumvent this outcome by subsequently applying for a new billboard would not 
confer standing or extend the time for appeal (R.3486). 
Without question, these determinations were correct. Pursuant to SSL Ordinance 
§17.02.030.K, Republic had ten days to appeal SSL's decision to issue the permit in ques-
tion to SSL's Board of Adjustment. It is undisputed that Republic failed to do so. An 
aggrieved person may file for judicial review only after submitting an appeal to the Board 
of Adjustment, which must be made within 30 days after the Board's decision. SSL 
Ordinance §17.02.030.K.2. 
Republic does not challenge these particular findings and conclusions. Instead, 
Republic argues that it did not have standing to challenge the SSL Wilderness Permit. 
Under that argument, Republic's claim fails instantly. A litigant must have standing in 
order to ask a court for relief "A private individual must both allege and prove special 
damages peculiar to himself in order to entitle him to maintain an action to enjoin" a par-
ticular alleged violation. Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976). Without standing 
to complain of the issuance of the SSL Wilderness Permit, Republic has no business ask-
ing this Court for anything in relation to that permit. 
Republic then argues that it did not obtain standing until it applied for a permit on 
the Network Electric property, a sign location that would have been within 200 feet of the 
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already-permitted and constructed Wilderness sign. See Republic's Brief, pp. 17, 49-51; 
Sept. Order, \ 5.06 (R.3486). Republic knew this proposed sign would be closer to the 
Wilderness sign than municipal ordinance allowed. See Republic's Brief, p. 17. Never-
theless, Republic argues that its Network Electric application, and its subsequent attempts 
to appeal SSL's denial of this new application, somehow constitute exhaustion of its 
administrative remedies in relation to SSL's prior determination to grant the SSL 
Wilderness Permit to Reagan. See Republic's Brief, pp. 49-51. Republic's position 
ignores the ruling of the district court - that any argument relating to the Network Electric 
application is superfluous, as it amounts to nothing more than a self-inflicted injury that 
cannot circumvent proper pursuit of administrative remedies. 
The district court determined that "Republic attempted to collaterally attack the 
permit that SSL issued for the [Wilderness] sign by submitting a new application for a 
billboard ("Network Electric") even closer to Wilderness than the Deck Hockey proposed 
location; but a self-inflicted injury does not confer standing, nor can it extend the time for 
appeal." Sept. Order, \ 5.06 (R.3486). Republic sets forth no argument or analysis as to 
why this determination is incorrect. To the contrary, the law is clear that a self-inflicted 
injury, one that the complainant imposes on itself by voluntarily undertaking to do or not 
do something, does not confer standing. See Raymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collec-
tions, Inc., 2004 UT 27, f^ 7, 89 P.3d 171; Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen 
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 457 F.3d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). If Republic 
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suffered any damage as a result of its Network Electric application, it suffered such 
damage only because it submitted that application for a location it knew was too close to 
the Wilderness sign. But for this voluntary submission, Republic suffered no damage 
from issuance of the SSL Wilderness Permit that would be any different than that suffered 
by any other member of the community at large. The new application did not give 
Republic standing to challenge the SSL Wilderness Permit. 
Furthermore, in asserting that it was not an aggrieved party absent the Network 
Electric application, Republic also ignores the district court's ruling to the contrary. The 
district court found that in its pleadings filed with the court, Republic had "admitted that 
its interests in the Deck Hockey location were adversely affected by SSL's decision to 
issue the WLH permit, in that' if this Court upholds the validity of the [WLH] sign, then 
the Deck Hockey sign would be within 500 feet of [WLH] and would not be a permissible 
application. Thus, Republic clearly has standing to challenge the issuance of the [SSL] 
permit, as well as the UDOT permit, on the [WLH] site.'" Sept. Order, par. 5.01, R.3485, 
quoting Republic's Reply Memorandum to Reagan's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment Motion, p. 25. Republic does not mention this admission in its Brief. 
Having failed to timely challenge the permit when it had the opportunity to do so as an 
aggrieved party, Republic had no right to pursue any arguments regarding the SSL 
Wilderness Permit in the district court. 
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Republic's belated demands that SSL investigate the SSL Wilderness Permit 
(Republic's Brief, pp. 50-51) were all made in the context of the Network Electric appeal. 
Even if those demands were to be considered independently, Republic could not circum-
vent the appeals time by insisting that SSL take action to revoke the permit. In Foutz v. 
City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d 1171, the plaintiffs similarly sought to cir-
cumvent the municipality's initial land use decision. In that case, the South Jordan City 
Council had approved construction of structures that the plaintiffs alleged violated city 
ordinances. Id. at \ 1. Long after the appeals time, and after the structures were built, the 
plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to U.C.A. § 10-9-1002(l)(a) (2001), which allowed 
private citizens to sue to enjoin allegedly unlawful uses (coined in the case as the "En-
forcement section"). Id. at [^4. The Court noted that the gravamen of the complaint was 
the zoning administrator's initial decision to allow the allegedly unlawful activity. Id. at 
<|23. The "Appeals section" of the statute required individuals challenging a munici-
pality's land use decision to file suit within thirty days of the decision. Id. at \ 6. The 
Court held that the plaintiffs could not miss the appeals time, and later argue that the use 
was an ongoing enforcement issue that could be resolved via the Enforcement section. 
Instead, they were obligated to timely appeal the initial decision that allowed the use: 
Because virtually every challenge to a land use decision could be alterna-
tively characterized as an "enforcement" action, allowing a challenge to a 
municipality's land use decision under the Enforcement section would nul-
lify the very existence of the exhaustion and timing requirements specified 
in the Appeals section. We therefore hold that plaintiffs, as parties seeking 
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redress from a municipal land use decision, were obligated to comply with 
the requirements of the Appeals section. 
Id. at f^ 14. The Foutz Court also went on to reject the argument that the appeal time 
should have commenced when the city refused to reverse its original land use decision. 
The Court instead held that those subsequent decisions could not "operate to artificially 
lengthen the statutorily mandated time for challenging the land use decision." Id. at f 25. 
Subsequent to the Foutz decision, the Utah Legislature codified the holding in that 
case, eliminating the Enforcement section altogether, and tying the appeal time to the 
initial land use decision: 
The applicant, a board or officer of the municipality, or any person 
adversely affected by the land use authority's decision administering or 
interpreting a land use ordinance may, within the time period provided by 
ordinance, appeal that decision to the appeal authority by alleging that there 
is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by the 
land use authority in the administration or interpretation of the land use 
ordinance. 
U.C.A. § 10-9a-703. 
The appeal time provided by SSL ordinance is ten days after the adversely affected 
person receives notice of the decision. Ord. § 17.02.030.K.2. Republic had notice of 
SSL's decision to issue the SSL Wilderness Permit as early as February 28th and no later 
than April 1st, but filed no appeals whatsoever until after April 18th. Under the principles 
announced in Foutz, and subsequently made crystal clear by the Legislature, Republic 
cannot, by collateral attack through its Network Electric application or through its other 
protestations to SSL regarding the permit, lengthen the time provided by SSL ordinances 
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to challenge the City's decision to issue the WLH permit. The district court properly 
found as a matter of law that "Subsequent demands that Republic made to SSL to revoke 
the WLH permit also did not operate to extend the time to appeal." Sept. Order, par. 5.08 
(R3486). 
The remainder of Republic's argument on this point focuses on the merits of its 
argument about the validity of Reagan's SSL Wilderness Permit. See Republic's Brief, 
pp. 52-53. As set forth in section C of this Brief, this argument was not considered by the 
district court, as it was moot once the district court determined it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Sept. Order, f 5.09 (R.3486). Accordingly, this argument is not properly 
before this Court. 
Republic has failed to show that the district court committed any error when it 
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Republic's allegations 
relating to the SSL Wilderness Permit. Because Republic did not exhaust its 
administrative remedies, it could not present these arguments to the district court. 
2. Republic Fails to Show the District Court Erred When it Determined 
That Republic Failed to Exhaust its Administrative Remedies in 
Relation to the UDOT Wilderness Permit 
Republic argues that the district court erred when it determined that Republic 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in relation to the UDOT Wilderness Permit. 
Asserting that it did everything possible within the ten days that the district court gave it 
to bring Reagan into the district court action, Republic claims it should be excused from 
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taking what it alleges would have been futile efforts at the administrative level. 
(Republic's Brief, p. 54). Once again, Republic fails to mention, let alone properly 
attack, the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions. Thus, Republic fails to 
set forth any reason to disturb the district court's determination. 
The district court noted several undisputed facts with respect to the UDOT 
Wilderness Permit. Reagan applied for and received the UDOT Wilderness Permit in 
October 2005. Sept. Order, ^ 1.17 (R.3479).8 Reagan built the Wilderness sign in 
January 2006. f 1.18 (R.3480). Although this sign was within 500 feet of the location 
where Republic proposed to build its Deck Hockey sign, Republic took no steps to appeal 
UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness Permit within the 30 days after it undisputedly 
knew that the sign had been built. Id., ^ 1.19, 1.23 (R.3480). Based on these undisputed 
facts, the district court determined as a matter of law, that because Republic did nothing 
to appeal UDOT's decision within 30 days after it undisputedly had notice of the permit, 
as required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-3(4) and Utah Administrative Code R907-
1-3, Republic failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id., ^[ 4.01, 4.02, 4.08 
(R.3483-84). 
Republic does not set forth any meaningful challenge to these factual findings and 
legal conclusions. In a footnote on p. 55 of its Brief, Republic does mention that it 
8
 It is undisputed that this occurred in 2005, despite the typographical error in the 
district court's finding. See R.1332 and Exhibit Ml3 thereto. 
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disagrees with the facts in paragraph 4.02, but provides no contrary record citation, or any 
analysis of why it believes that this conclusion is incorrect.9 
Republic also provides no analysis of the district court ruling that Republic failed 
to follow its administrative remedies in relation to its October 2006 demand that UDOT 
revoke the Wilderness Permit. Sept. Order, fflf 4.03-4.08 (R.3484). Republic asserts only 
that UDOT's failure to respond to its demand is evidence that administrative relief was a 
futile endeavor. (Republic's Brief, pp. 54-55). That assertion ignores the district court's 
conclusions of law that UDOT's failure to respond constituted final agency action, and 
that Republic did not adequately or timely appeal from that final agency action. Sept. 
Order, ^[ 4.05-4.08 (R.3484). Republic does not even mention these conclusions in its 
Brief. 
Republic's failure to brief these issues provides a basis for this Court to affirm the 
district court's rulings: (1) that Republic should have appealed UDOT's decision to issue 
9
 Paragraph 4.02 states, "Republic did not file a request for agency action seeking 
review of UDOT's decision to issue the Wilderness Permit within 30 days after UDOT 
granted the permit, or within 30 days after Republic undisputedly had notice of the 
permit." This paragraph was based on the district court's legal conclusion in paragraph 
4.01 that "Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ('UAPA'), if the decision being 
challenged is an application, then 'the request for agency action seeking review must be 
filed with the agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules/ Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-3(4). Incorporating from Utah Administrative Code R907-1-3 the only appeals 
period prescribed by UDOT's rules [30 days], UAPA requires that a request to review a 
UDOT decision to grant or deny an application must be submitted within 30 days..." ^ f 
4.01, R.3483. Republic has provided no briefing as to why it believes this Conclusion of 
Law is not correct. 
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the Wilderness Permit no later than March of 2006, and (2), even if the October 2006 
letter was an effective invocation of its administrative rights, Republic did not adequately 
or timely appeal from UDOT's final agency action taken with respect to that letter. 
Ignoring the district court's conclusion that it should have appealed no later than 
March, 2006, Republic instead argues that its ability to pursue its administrative remedies 
was restricted in some manner by the district court's October 2006 order that Republic 
take steps within ten days to include Reagan as a party defendant to the action. A few 
days after the October 3, 2006 hearing in which the district court announced that ruling, 
Republic sent UDOT a letter demanding that it revoke the Wilderness Permit. Sept. 
Order, ffif 1.25, 1.25 (R.3480). UDOT sent a response to Republic on October 31, 2006, 
and took no further action within 30 days of that letter. Id, ffif 1.28, 1.29 (R.3481). 
Republic's argument that the ten days granted by district court to include Reagan 
somehow prevented Republic from exhausting its administrative remedies is simply 
unfounded. Nothing prevented Republic from pursuing its administrative rights prior to 
being ordered in October 2006 to bring Reagan into the case. Republic had been on 
constructive notice of the UDOT Wilderness Permit since January 2006 when the sign 
was built. See R.3480. Republic undisputedly had actual notice of the permit at the end 
of February 2006, see id, and it had been complaining about the sign to SSL throughout 
the summer of 2006. Republic's Brief, pp. 50-51. The Court's October 2006 Order 
simply had no effect on Republic's ability to pursue administrative remedies prior to then. 
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Moreover, the district court asked Republic's counsel how much time he required 
to take steps to bring Reagan into the proceeding, and counsel responded ten days. See 
Transcript for Motion Hearing, p. 27, (R.989). Counsel made no mention of any concern 
that the timing would somehow interfere with Republic's administrative remedies, even 
though the district court had noted that the parties may be right back before it on a claim 
that Republic had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id., pp. 17, 27. Had 
Republic actually believed it was prejudiced by having to add Reagan as a party before 
exhausting any administrative remedies it had left, it would have made some mention of 
the same to the district court, and should have objected in some fashion to the court's 
order. It did neither of these things. Accordingly, Republic's argument that it somehow, 
in some unmentioned way, was unable to exhaust its administrative remedies because of 
the district court's October 2006 Order is simply without merit. 
This Court can readily dispose of the request that it "find and declare an exception 
to the exhaustion requirement exists when a litigant is forced to prematurely sue another 
party." Republic's Brief, p. 44. In addition to the fact that Republic was not prevented 
from pursuing its administrative remedies months before the district court's order, Repub-
lic's request should be denied for failure to adequately brief the issue. "This court has 
routinely declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." 
Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
{citing State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Cat. App.1992)); see also Tasters Ltd. v. 
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Dep't of Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12, 25 n. 15 (Utah Ct. App.1993), cert, denied, 878 
P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Republic's argument consists of one paragraph (Republic's 
Brief, pp. 43-44), and offers no legal analysis as to why a new exception should be 
created, let alone applied to this case. 
Exceptions to this rule are not created or applied at a whim. Instead, they "exist in 
unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or 
injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged 
grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." State Tax 
Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). Republic simply states that a new 
exception should be created without explaining what remedies were otherwise available 
and why it did not pursue them. This is insufficient to disturb the district court's ruling 
that Republic did not avail itself of administrative remedies as to the SSL permit or the 
UDOT permit. See Sept. Order, ffif 4.08, 5.04 (R.3484, 3486). 
Accordingly, Republic has provided no reason to disturb the district court's 
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make any orders regarding the 
UDOT Wilderness Permit. 
E. REPUBLIC FAILS TO SHOW ANY "BIAS" OR "MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE". 
Republic's sixth issue on appeal asserts that Republic should have been excused 
from exhausting its administrative remedies because an exception exists where "bias or 
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prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated." Republic's Brief, p. 44.10 
However, Republic fails to set forth any facts that could substantiate such a conclusion 
and fails to demonstrate any error committed by the district court in regard to this issue. 
Republic fails to make even one single record citation for any of the allegations of 
"fact" in its argument. See Republic's Brief, pp. 45-48. Republic thus fails to set forth 
facts "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f^ 23. In addition, Republic provides no legal 
support for its argument. The Utah cases to which Republic cites do not even mention 
bias or prejudgment, or what is necessary to show such bias or prejudgment in order to 
meet an exception to the exhaustion rule. See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com% 2001 UT 
74, 34 P.3d 180, and TDM, Inc. v. Tax Com% 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190. Instead, 
these cases merely state the general rule that "parties must exhaust applicable 
10
 The district court noted that the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement that 
Republic had argued were "(i) when exhaustion would serve no useful purpose, (ii) where 
the agency has positively stated what its ruling will be in a particular case, and (iii) where 
bias or prejudgment by the decision maker can be demonstrated." Sept. Order.,§ 2.05 
(R.3482). Republic does not challenge that ruling. Further, other than broadly citing to 
three memoranda below that are comprised of a total of 289 pages (Republic's Brief, p. 4) 
Republic has not shown where below it preserved its argument that this Court should con-
sider whether "some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be uncon-
scionable not to review the alleged grievance..." (Republic's Brief, p. 45). In any event, 
Republic had ample opportunity at the administrative level to challenge the actions of 
UDOT's permits officer and its attorney. Republic has made no showing what the rulings 
of the administrative hearing officer would have been had Republic taken the correct 
course of action, i.e., one that would have given the hearing officer the power to affect 
Reagan's permits, either before or after they were granted. 
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administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review" and that "[excep-
tions to this rule exist in unusual circumstances [not involving bias or prejudgment.]" 
Nebeker, 200117174,^14. 
Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm % 106 P.3d 455 (Idaho 2005), to which Republic 
cites, even if applicable here, demonstrates the paucity of Republic's argument, as the 
Idaho Supreme Court required "specific facts" that "rise to the level necessary to infer 
bias or prejudgment" on the part of the decision-maker at issue. Id. at 462-63. Because 
the plaintiff in that case failed to provide such facts, its dismissal pursuant to a 12(b) 
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was affirmed. Id. 
Republic's argument fails for the same reason - Republic fails to set forth any 
specific facts that could show any bias on the part of UDOT's hearing officer. Accord-
ingly, Republic fails to show that the district court erred when it determined that Republic 
was not excused from exhausting its administrative remedies. 
Even if Republic could present facts sufficient to support its argument, that there 
was some oppression being caused by UDOT's permits officer and attorney, Republic 
still fails to present a reason to overturn the district court's ruling. Republic must 
demonstrate it is the bias or prejudgments of the decision-maker that excuses the 
exhaustion requirement. See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm % 106 P.3d at 462. 
(Exception exists "because '[t]he due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and 
disinterested tribunal.'") (citations omitted). The fact that there is a distinction between 
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UDOTs hearing officer on the one hand, and UDOT's permits officer and its attorney on 
the other hand, seems to be largely lost on Republic. Asserting that UDOT did this or that 
UDOT said that, Republic attributes this conduct only once to the hearing officer: 
"[Hjearing officer David Miles first approves (exparte) Reagan's R-407 [Permit 
application] and then sits in judgment over Republic's challenge to that approval. What 
more 'prejudgment' could ever be shown, over the exact same facts?" Republic's Brief, 
p. 47. The fallacy of this statement in the context of Republic's failure to exhaust its 
administrative remedies can be seen if a couple of words and phrases are interlineated 
into Republic's statement: 
[HJearing officer David Miles first approves (ex parte because Republic 
failed to intervene in the Lindal proceedings) Reagan's R-407 [Lindal 
application] and then sits in judgment over Republic's collateral challenge 
in the Deck Hockey proceeding to that approval. 
With these additional words and phrases, it becomes evident that Mr. Miles was not 
determining the "exact same facts" in both proceedings, as Republic urges. Republic 
never presented its "facts" in the Lindal proceedings; thus, Mr. Miles did not consider 
them there. Once the Lindal Permit was issued, Mr. Miles could not take any steps to 
affect the permit in the absence of Reagan. See argument, supra, at section B, subpoint 5, 
p. 23. Republic failed to participate in the Lindal proceedings, and was thereafter 
prohibited from collaterally attacking the permit in the Deck Hockey proceedings. 
Republic's failures and improper challenge in the collateral Deck Hockey proceedings 
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cannot be the basis for an inference that Mr. Miles was biased or that he had prejudged 
anything. 
This Court should therefore affirm the district court's ruling on summary judgment 
that Republic "failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine issue of material 
fact that would demonstrate that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirements applies." Sept. Order, f 4.09. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED REPUBLIC A TRIAL DE NOVO, 
AND PROPERLY LIMITED REPUBLIC TO INTRODUCING EVIDENCE 
UNRELATED TO THE REAGAN PERMITS. 
Republic's allegations regarding issuance of the Reagan permits have no 
relevance, as a matter of law, to Republic's appeal of its Deck Hockey application. The 
district court could not consider anything regarding the Wilderness sign. Instead, it was 
obligated to "simply determine whether the application was rightly rejected. In deter-
mining that question, the court stands in the same position as the [administrative official] 
did."). U.S. v. 4thDist Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1951), reh. den. 242 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1952). 
The legislature provided that any person aggrieved by the engineer's deci-
sion may bring an 'action in the district court for a plenary review thereof 
and that the hearing therein 'shall proceed as a trial de novo.' The use of 
the terms 'review' and 'trial de novo' indicate that the court shall review 
only the issues of law and fact which were involved in the engineer's 
decision. That is, whether the application shall be approved or rejected, and 
as a corollary thereto whether on all the evidence adduced at such trial de 
novo, the engineer's approval or rejection should be sustained, rejected or 
modified. 
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M a t 1135. 
In the case at bar, the facts as they existed at the time of the original decision con-
trolled whether the hearing officer was right or wrong. The construction of the WLH sign 
(with the concomitant removal of the Lindal sign) occurred years after the hearing officer 
had rejected the Deck Hockey application. As such, those events could not affect the 
correctness of the hearing officer's decision. 
Further, for the reasons set forth supra at section C, p. 28, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to make any determinations concerning the Lindal and Wilderness Permits. It 
therefore could not have ordered either one of the permits revoked or the signs removed. 
Republic was free to introduce any other evidence it desired (so long as that evidence 
existed at the time of the hearing officer's decision). But all Republic wanted to talk 
about was Reagan's signs. (Republic's Brief, pp. 36-37). Republic was not entitled to a 
permit on the Deck Hockey property unless Reagan was deprived of either the Lindal or 
the Wilderness Permits. Republic admitted as much in its counsel's colloquy with the 
Court. See, Republic's Brief, pp. 36-37. The district court did not deny Republic a trial 
de novo - it properly limited Republic to addressing issues for which it had adequately 
exhausted its administrative rights. 
CONCLUSION 
To properly challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment, Republic 
has the burden of setting forth all issues of disputed fact and to show lhat such facts are 
Page 46 of 48 
material. See Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). Republic has failed to do this. Republic must also show that the district 
court erred when it applied the governing law to the undisputed facts of record. See 
Panos v. Olsen and Assoc. Const, Inc., 2005 UT App 446, f 10, 123 P.3d 816. Republic 
has failed to make this showing. Because Republic has not set forth a reason to reverse or 
otherwise disturb the district court's determinations, those determinations should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ZJ day of January, 2010. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Appellee R.O.A. General, Inc. 
Page 47 of 48 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on this 2- day of January, 2010,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Brief via First Class Mail, postage fully pre-paid, to the 
following: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Asst. Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140858 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Paul H. Roberts (Bar. No. 11758) 
220 East Morris Ave, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Appellee South Salt Lake City 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
1011 Washington, Suite 101 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
Page 48 of 48 
